Tahafut al-Falasifa - Chapter 1

First Argument

The philosophers advance the following argument: assume that we are at a stage where God has not yet created the world. In order for the world to be created, there must be a determinant for its existence. Then there would be a time $t$ where there is no determinant for the existence of the world, and some time $t^{\prime }>t$ where there is a determinant for the existence of the world. The question arises: whence did this determinant originate? A further question: why did this determinant come into being at time $t^{\prime }$ and not some earlier or later time? The only explanation is that at time $t^{\prime }$, God willed the world to be created, and at time $t$, God did not will for the world to be created. But this would mean the will of God has an origin in time, which is absurd, since God is not subject to temporal events. Moreover, the problem of the sufficient reason for choosing time $t^{\prime }$ still persists.

First Objection

al-Ghazali responds by saying: it is entirely possible that God willed that the world be created at time $t^{\prime }$ from pre-eternity. That is, there would be no change in the divine essence, since the divine essence eternally willed for the creation of the world at time $t^{\prime }$.

• This response correctly identifies that there need not be any change in the eternal will to create the world, but it doesn’t solve the problem of giving a sufficient reason for God choosing time $t^{\prime }$ over all other times. From what I know of al-Ghazali’s work, his position is that time is a creation of God, and both time and the world were created “simultaneously”. Such a position would solve the issue without having to reject the principle of sufficient reason.
• A note about al-Ghazali’s purpose in writing the Tahafut: al-Ghazali’s responses to arguments are not always rebuttals, but they are attempts to show that the philosophers’ arguments are not apodictic because they cannot show how an alternative possibility would result in a contradiction.

The philosophers respond by saying: if the creation of the world is a temporal event, it has a cause. A fact about causes is that when all the requisite conditions for the cause to produce the effect are satisfied, the cause necessarily produces the effect. al-Ghazali would essentially be saying that all the requisite conditions for the creation of the world were satisfied, yet the production of the effect was seemingly delayed for no reason, denying a necessary truth about causation.

• This is wrong because God’s will is atemporal. It’s not like there’s a time where God wills, since God wills outside of time. It is rather that God wills that events happen at certain times.

al-Ghazali responds by saying: “how do you know the impossibility of ascribing the origin of something to an eternal will”? Is it by a deductive argument? No deductive argument has ever been provided. Is it a self-evident truth? Then why do so many people believe in the temporal origination of the world? Moreover, the eternal will does not resemble the temporal will.

The philosophers respond by saying:

We know by rational necessity that, if all the conditions for causal operation are complete, it is inconceivable that the cause should fail to produce the effect. He who admits the possibility of such a thing challenges the necessity of reason.

al-Ghazali responds by saying: if you appeal to rational necessity, what about your opponents who appeal to the self-evident impossibility of your view that God knows all universals without adding anything to his essence? You respond by saying God’s eternal knowledge cannot be compared with creaturely temporal knowledge. More to the point, let us advance the following argument concerning the impossibility of the eternity of the world and see how you disprove it:

The eternity of the world is impossible. For it leads to the affirmation of spherical revolutions which are infinite in number, and consist of innumerable units. The fact is that these revolutions can be divided into one-sixth, or one-fourth, or a half. For instance, the sphere of the Sun completes one revolution in one year, while that of Saturn makes one in thirty years. Therefore, the revolutions of Saturn are one-thirtieth of those of the Sun. And the revolutions of Jupiter are one-twelfth of those of the Sun, for Jupiter completes one revolution in twelve years.

• Essentially, al-Ghazali’s claim is that the eternity of the world would result in a quantity whose proper part is equal to its whole, which is nonsensical (this is the same criticism Leibniz used against the idea of an actual infinity).
• In modern mathematics, a set A with a proper subset B that is equinumerous with A is called Dedekind-infinite, and it is perfectly reasonable for infinite sets to behave this way.

al-Ghazali says: the quantity of revolutions cannot be declared even or odd. If it is even, the addition of one revolution will make it odd. If it is odd, the addition of one revolution will make it even. Hence, the quantity of revolutions is neither even or odd, which is nonsensical.

The philosophers reply: only the finite can be named even or odd; the infinite cannot.

al_Ghazali says:

If there is totality which is composed of units, and which—as we saw above—can be divided into one-sixth, one-tenth, etc.; and if still it cannot be described as odd or even, then we must call it a self-evident absurdity, to prove which point we need not advance any rational argument. How will you answer this criticism?

The philosophers respond:

Error lies in your words: ‘A totality composed of units.’ As a matter of fact, the revolutions of the sphere are nonexistent. Those which took place in the past are gone; while those which will take place in the future are yet to be produced. The word ‘Totality’ points to beings which are present here and now. But in this case, no such being is to be found.

al-Ghazali states that any quantity must be described as either even or odd, and that the existence or non-existence of the things counted is irrelevant.

Moreover, al-Ghazali states that even according to the philosophers’ principles, it is possible for there to be quantities that count existing things that are not described as even or odd. For example, if the world is eternal and there have always been humans, then the number of souls existing would be infinite in number. al-Ghazali mentions that Ibn Sina held this position about souls, and that perhaps Aristotle held it.

A possible reply from the philosophers is:

The true opinion about the souls is the one held by Plato. Plato thought that the soul is eternal: that, although one by nature, it gets divided when it is related to bodies; and that, after its separation from bodies, it returns to its original character, and is reunified.

al-Ghazali responds by saying that this position is an absurdity. For example, the souls of Zayd and ‘Amr are either identical or not identical. If they were identical, then the two would share the same consciousness, which is obviously false. If their souls are not identical, then by hypothesis, there would be one soul that is divided into two bodies; this is an absurdity because the soul is immaterial and has no magnitude or quantity, and so cannot be divided. The purpose of the previous points is to show that if the philosophers want to say that the temporal origination of the world by the eternal will is contrary to rational necessity, then they need to show how their position is not contrary to rational necessity, but this is something they will never be able to show.

• al-Ghazali’s arguments about infinity are completely false (he’s not to be blamed since there wasn’t a mathematically precise theory of infinity until the late 19th century), and so this entire section sort of falls flat on its face.
• Moreover, his argument of “if you claim that this position is against rational necessity, you need to show how your position is not against rational necessity” is a rhetorical rather than philosophical argument.

A new objection to the temporal origination of the world from an eternal will is raised. The philosophers say: since all moments of time are alike, nothing would distinguish one moment of time from another for the creation of the world. Moreover, both the existence and non-existence of the world are equally possible, and there does not exist anything to distinguish them in terms of possibility. Even if we say that the eternal will had a special relation to one of the two possibilities, this would render the creation of the world entirely arbitrary.

al-Ghazali responds by saying: “the eternal will produced the world as it is, wherever it is, and whatever it is like”. He further states that the entire function of the will is to distinguish things that are similar.

The philosophers respond by saying: it is impossible to distinguish things that are similar in every respect.

al-Ghazali has two objections to this:

1. The will of God is not like the will of temporal creatures. Moreover, even in the case of temporal creatures, the will can distinguish things that are similar in every respect. Say you have a man with two dates before him, and they are equal with respect to his purpose (same distance, same color, texture, etc.). He will obviously be able to choose one even though they are similar in every respect - and this is through the function of his will, whose purpose is to distinguish things that are similar. The philosophers are left with two choices:

   i) It is inconceivable for two things to be equal with respect to a man’s purpose. This is false, since the equality with respect to purposes can be posited without leading to a contradiction.

   ii) The man cannot choose either date. This is self-evidently false.

2. In the philosophers’ own theories, they suppose that a distinction can be made between two like things. Since they claim that the world was created by a cause which necessitates a certain shape for the world, the question arises: why this particular shape and not another? Nothing distinguishes the different shapes in terms of possibility

The philosophers respond to the second point by saying: in the case of the shape of the world, or the movement of the celestial spheres, there is a most perfect way for this to be ordered, and this is the way they have been ordered. It is impossible for them to be otherwise. With the moments of time, however, each is like another in every respect. It cannot be said that the world would be more perfect if it was created earlier or later.

al-Ghazali says: on the contrary, there is a most perfect time for the world to be created. but this is not the argument we will use. We will show that, fundamentally, a distinction between like things is acceptable to the philosophers. The philosophers say that the heavens move on two poles. Out of the infinitely many points on the heavenly sphere to be chosen as poles, why were these two chosen and not any other? There is clearly no distinction between the points in respect of being poles.

The philosophers respond by saying:

Perhaps the position of the point of the poles is distinct from other points by virtue of a property which is suited to that point’s being the point of the pole. This property being permanent, the point of the pole does not depart from its particular place (or space, or position, or whatever name may be supposed to be applicable in this case). In the course of celestial revolutions, all the positions on the sphere, which determine its relation to the Earth and to other spheres, are changed; but the position of the poles is constant. Presumably, therefore, this position was fitter than any other position to remain constant.

al-Ghazali responds by saying: this would mean the points on the heavenly sphere are dissimilar, which goes against the philosophers’ contention that the reason heaven is a sphere because all of the points on a sphere are equivalent. Moreover, this response does not render the objection invalid since it may be asked whether other points of heaven were capable of receiving this property. If the answer is yes, the question arises of why only a few similar points are capable of receiving this property and not the rest. If the answer is no, then there would be no reason for this specific point to have this property, since all points of the heavenly sphere are equivalent. Thus, the choice of poles must have been either completely arbitrary, or points on the heavenly sphere were distinguished from the rest to be chosen as poles.

al-Ghazali raises a further objection: why is it that the spheres in some cases move from east to west instead of west to east, since the directions are equivalent?

Second Objection

It may be said: You reject as impossible the procession of a temporal from an eternal being. But you will have to admit its possibility. For there are temporal phenomena in the world. And some other phenomena are the causes of those phenomena. Now, it is impossible that one set of temporal phenomena should be caused by another, and that the series should go on ad infinitum. No intelligent person can believe such a thing. If it had been possible, you would not have considered it obligatory on your part to introduce the Creator (into your theories), or affirm the Necessary Being in Whom all the possible things have their Ground.

So, if there is a limit at which the series of temporal phenomena stops, let this limit be called the Eternal. And this proves how the possibility of the procession of a temporal from an eternal being can be deduced from their fundamental principles.

The philosophers respond by saying: we do not say the procession of a temporal being from an eternal being is impossible, only that the procession of the first temporal being from an eternal being is impossible. This is because in the case of the first temporal being, there is nothing to distinguish its moment of appearance with previous moments in terms of any possible aptitude for existence. In the case of other temporal beings, there are new circumstances that allow moments to be distinguished.

al-Ghazali responds by saying: “in the case of other temporal beings, there are new circumstances that allow moments to be distinguished”: this raises the question of how those new circumstances arose. Either the causal chain will go on to infinity, or it will stop at an eternal being, from which the first temporal being originated.

The philosophers respond by saying: these temporal events have their causes in the movement of the spheres, whose rotary motion is eternal. The rotary motion of the spheres is also temporal in one respect, since every part of it comes into being after not having been.

al-Ghazali responds by saying: is this rotary motion eternal or temporal? If eternal, then how did it become the cause of the first temporal being? If temporal, there would again be an infinite regress of causes. This concludes the objection. This point will be dealt with more fully later, where it will be refuted that the heavenly spheres are the causes of temporal events.

• The Aristotelian theory of the movement of planets and stars being the cause of all temporal events is so absurd and makes no sense to me.

Second Argument

The second argument the philosophers make is as follows: there are two ways in which we may mean that God is prior to the world and time:

1. God is prior to the world and time in essence.
2. God is prior to the world and time in time. If the first meaning is taken, then the existence of God would immediately imply the existence of the world, just as the existence of a logical antecedent implies the existence of its consequent, although the antecedent is logically prior to its consequent. This would mean God and the world are either both eternal or both temporal. If the second meaning is taken, this would mean there would be an infinite amount of time before the creation of time, which is self-contradictory. Hence, one cannot believe in the origination of time, which is defined to be the measure of motion. This means that motion is eternal, and hence the world is eternal.

• The syllogism P1 If time has always existed, then motion has always existed. P2 Time has always existed. C Motion has always existed. is Aristotle’s original argument for the eternity of the world.

• “God is prior to the world and time in time” is a nonsensical statement.

God al-Ghazali Plato Aristotle